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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this court pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated Section 77-35-26(b)(2) (1953 as amended) and Utah 
Code Annotated Section 78-20-3(2)(3)(1953 as amended). Whereby 
the defendant in a District Court Criminal action may take an 
appeal to the Court of Appeals from a final judgment and 
conviction of any crime other than first degree or capital felony. 
TEXT OF STATUTES 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, $76-6-402 (1) (19(5 3 as amended) 
76-6-402. Presumptions and defemses. The following 
presumption shall be applicable to this part): 
(1) Possession of property recently stolen, when no 
satisfactory explanation of such possession is made, shall be 
deemed prima facie evidence that the person in possession stole 
the property. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, S76-6-408 (1953 AS AMENDED) 
76-6-408. Receiving stolen property--Duties of 
pawnbrokers. 
(1) A person commits theft if he receives, retains, or 
disposes of the property of another knowing that it has been 
stolen, or believing that it probably has been stolen, or who 
conceals, sells, withholds or aids in concealing, selling, or 
withholding any such property from the owner, knowing the property 
to be stolen, with a purpose to deprive the owner thereof. 
(3) As used in this section: 
(a) "Receives" means acquiring possession, control, or 
title or lending on the security of the property; 
(b) ,fDealern means a person in the business of buying or 
sel1i ng goods. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether a jury instruction whidh permits the jury to 
draw an inference of knowledge in light ot the facts and 
circumstances constitutes reversible error. 
2. Whether circumstantial evidence is sufficient to 
establish the guilt of the accused. 
3. Whether a jury instruction involving the "reasonable 
alternative hypothesis" is required in a circumstantial case. 
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STATEMFNT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgmen t and conviction against 
appellant by the Honorable Richard H. Moffat, Judge, Third Judicial 
Court in and for Salt Lake County, Sltate of Utah, ordering 
appellant placed on probation for eighteen months for a third 
degree felony conviction of Theft by Receivling. 
STATEMENT OF THE FAdTS 
On September 28, 1986, at approximately 9:00 p.m., at the 
t, Officer Bruce Walker 
th a male companion. The 
intersection of 3900 South and 800 Easp 
noticed the defendant riding in a car wi 
driver appeared to be talking to the defendant. The driver, upon 
seeing the patrol car, seemed agitated an<p pulled off the road and 
parked behind a building. Officer Walker continued on but then 
decided to turn back and take a closer look at the vehicle. When 
he arrived behind the building he found that the driver had fled 
from the vehicle, but the defendant Martinez was sitting in the 
passenger seat of the car. (R. 24-26.) The defendant appeared to 
be asleep even though Officer Walker, just moments earlier, had 
observed the driver talking to the defendant. 
Officer Walker gently knocked on the window to get the 
defendant's attention. Officer Walker noticed a television, a VCR 
and a camera in plain view on the back seat of the car. Officer 
Walker ask the defendant what happened to the driver. The 
defendant said she did not know where the driver was but said the 
driver would be right back. Officer Walker waited over an hour but 
the driver never returned. 
Defendant claimed to be the owner of the car but failed to 
produce proper registration. Investigation revealed the car was 
actually registered to another person. At that point Officer 
Walker impounded the vehicle. 
Defendant disclaimed any knowledge as to the large items 
on the back seat of her car and told Officer Walker that she had 
been to a party in Big Cottonwood Canyon and did not know how she 
got to 3900 South and 800 East, the location where Officer Walker 
found her. 
Officer Walker discovered that less than an hour prior to 
his encounter with the defendant, a burglary had taken place within 
three miles of where he spotted the defendant. The items found in 
defendant's car, plus a watch found in defendant's coat pocket, had 
been reported stolen. (R. 26-27.) Officer Walker then placed 
defendant under arrest for receiving stolen property. 
Based on the evidence presented at I trial, a jury convicted 
the defendant of Theft by Receiving. Defendant appeals the 
conviction alleging that: 
1. Jury instruction number 21 ,| which permits the jury 
to draw an inference in light of the citcumstances, constitutes 
reversible error; and 
2. The Court should have instructed the jury that in 
addition to the burden of proof beyond a 
State must also pass the reasonable alternate 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Mversible error in giving 
reasonable doubt, the 
ive hypothesis test. 
The trial Court did not commit re 
Instruction No. 21 to the jury. The inst 
the law, by permitting the jury to draw a 
and intent if certain conditions are met 
both appropriate and constitutional, and placed the burden of proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt on the State. 
ruction correctly stated 
n inference of knowledge 
The instructions were 
The circumstantial evidence was s| 
jury verdict. In Utah, circumstantial 
competent to establish the guilt of the def 
ufficient to support the 
evidence alone may be 
bndant. 
In a criminal prosecution, jury instructions which require 
a standard of proof beyond a reasonable dol ubt are sufficient and it 
is not necessary to instruct the jury concerning the reasonable 
alternative hypothesis theory. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT 
REVERSIBLE ERROR BY SUBMITTING INSTRUCTION #21 
TO THE JURY. 
The defendant alleges that jury instruction number 21 
constitutes reversible error. The instruction states: 
"Possession of recently stolen property, if not 
satisfactorily explained, is ordinarily a 
circumstance from which you may reasonable 
[sic) draw the inference and find, in the light 
of the surrounding circumstances shown by the 
evidence of the case, that the person in 
possession knew the property had been stolen. 
The defendant claims that instruction number 21 gives an 
improper inference (T. 56-57). Section 76-6-402(1) Utah Code 
Annotated states: 
"Possession of property recently stolen, when 
no satisfactory explanation of such possession 
is made, shall be deemed prima facie evidence 
that the person in possession stole the 
property." 
There is no question that reversible error would have resulted if 
the trial court had used the language of the statute above in the 
instruction to the jury. Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 
(1985); State v. Chambers, 709 P.2d 321 (Utah 1985). 
In Chambers, the court held that "an instruction that 
simply incorporates the statutory language is unconstitutional 
when the statutory term t,fPrima faci^ ! is defined as a 
presumpt ion." 
However, the Utah Supreme Court h^s affirmed convictions 
based on an inference of guilty knowledge drawn from the fact of 
unexplained possession of stolen property State v. Smi th, 726 
P.2d 1232 (Utah 1986); State v. Graves, 31 Utah Adv. Rep. 41 
(1986); State v. Sessions, 583 P.2d 44 (Utah 1978); State v. 
Kirkman, 432 P.2d 638 (Utah 1967); State v 
(Utah 1926). In each case the Utah Supre 
use of the statutory language in jury 
possession of stolen property does not constitute reversible error 
In a recent decision the Supreme 
Merritt, 247 P.2d 497 
[me Court held that the 
instruction concerning 
Court of Utah held the 
following instruction to be both appropriate and constitutional: 
"Under the law of State of Utah, 
property recently stolen when 
possession fails to make a 
explanation of such possession, i 
which you may infer that th^ 
possession stole such property 
Johnson, 60 Utah Adv. Rep. 30 (198|). 
In this case the defendant, Nancy 
possession and control of the stolen prope 
possession of 
a person in 
sati sfactory 
s a fact from 
person in 
11
 State v. 
Martinez, was found in 
rty less than one hour 
after the burglary and the defendant was apprehended within three 
miles of the scene of the crime. (T. 30-
in actual possession of the watch which wa 
her black windbreaker which she had worn e4 
addition, the defendant exercised constructive possession over the 
5 2 ) . The defendant was 
|s found in the pocket of 
rlier that evening. In 
large items (the T.V., V.C.R and the Camera) because these items 
were found by Officer Walker on the back seat of Defendants car 
in plain view. The items were under the defendant's dominion and 
control. (T. 30-31). 
The trial court properly instructed the jury as to the 
legal definition of actual possession and constructive possession 
and the necessary requirement of finding such possession beyond a 
reasonable doubt. In Instruction Number 19 and 20 the court 
defined actual and constructive possession and the requirements 
for such possession. 
The defendant's explanation to Officer Walker was that 
she was asleep in the car in a sitting position while riding down 
the canyon from Storm Mountain. The defendant said she had no 
knowledge how the stolen property reached her car. (T. 33-34). 
"If the defendant gives a false account of how he acquired 
possession of stolen property this is a circumstance that may tend 
to show guilt." State v. Smith, 726 P.2d 1232, 1235 (Utah 198b) 
footnote 1. Furthermore, "In the absence of evidence as to why 
the defendant was in possession of recently stolen property, you 
may 'infer1 that the defendant stole the property." State v. 
Smith, supra. 
Defendant's failure to give a satisfactory explanation to 
the arresting officer as to the possession of stolen property 
raises an inference that she knows or has reason to believe she 
was in possession of stolen property. State v. Graves, 31 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 41 (1986). It is an accepted principle that Courts 
allow jury instructions stating that an 
knowledge may be drawn from the fact of unexplained possession of 
stolen goods. Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837 (1973). 
In Barnes, the United State Supreme Court approved the 
following jury instruction: 
iltly stolen 
inference of guilty 
M[ P o s s e s s i o n of recen 
property, if not satisfactorily Explained, is 
ordinarily a circumstance from which you may 
reasonably draw the inference and 
light of the surrounding circumsta 
the evidence in the case, that ihe person in 
possession knew the property had been stolen.1' 
find, in the 
nces shown bv 
Instruction Number 21 was based 
instruction given in both Barnes and Smith 
on the language and 
In Smi th, supra, the 
find from the evidence 
the defendant was in 
possession was not too 
d the defendant made no 
Ion, then you may infer 
instruction to the jury was that "if you 
and beyond a reasonable doubt, that 
possession of stolen property, that such 
remote in point of time from the theft, arj 
satisfactory explanation of such possessi 
from those facts that the defendant comlmitted the theft." Id 
p.1234 
The trial judge did not instruct Ithe jury to rely on the 
conclusive irrefutable presumption as to the element of knowledge 
or intent. The Court simply stated that if certain conditions are 
•et f (i.e. defendant is in possession of recently stolen property 
without a reasonable explanation as to Ipw this possession came 
about), the jury may, if it so chooses, infer the elements of 
knowledge or intent. 
The Supreme Court of Utah held that MinferenceM of guilt 
is permissible based on existence of certain facts that may lead 
the jury to believe the defendant committed theft by receiving. 
Such facts are clearly present in the case at bar. Defendant was 
found in possession of property that was stolen less than an hour 
prior to her questioning by Officer Walker. In addition, the 
defendant was located within three miles of where the burglary 
occurred. 
H . THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED WAS SUFFICIENT TO 
SUSTAIN THE CONVICTION OF THEFT BY RECEIVING? 
Defendant claims that the evidence which persuaded tne 
jury to render a guilty verdict leading to her conviction was 
insufficient to support the required statutory elements of Theft 
by Receiving. 
In a criminal prosecution, the State must introduce 
evidence sufficient to eliminate all reasonable doubt as to the 
accused's innocence from the minds of the jurors. State v. Lamm, 
606 P.2d 229 (Utah 1980). Sufficiency of evidence is a factual 
determination and as such is the exclusive function of the jury to 
weigh the evidence and reach a verdict. On appeal, the Courts 
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury 
verdict. In an appeal from a forgery conviction the Utah State 
Supreme Court held "we also view in a light most favorable to the 
jury's verdict those facts which can be re 
the evidence presented... ." State v. McC[ 
^sonably inferred from 
ardell, 652 P.2d 942 
(Utah 1982). In McCardel1, the court said 
with the verdict when the evidence is so lacking and insubstantial 
that no reasonable man could have reached a verdict beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Also, see State vs. Hansen, 710 P.2d 182 (Utah 
1985.) 
Defendant attempts, erroneously, to apply State v. Hill, 
it will only interfere 
727 P.2d 221 (Utah 1986) to the instant 
standard does not control here. The fact 
quite different from defendant's case. 
James, claimed that he purchased the chai 
obtained what he thought to be a valid bi 
defendant's claimed that they had no knowl^ 
property in their possession was stolen, 
defendant's explanation, if true, would 
elements of knowledge and intent, 
explanation combined with his signing of th 
giving his full name and address thus 
location and identification casts doubt on 
Court held that the evidence, taken as a 
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
reason to believe that he was in fact i 
property. 
p s e . However, Hill's 
situation in Hi 11 is 
In Hill, codefendant, 
rs in good faith, and 
1 of sale. There, the 
dge or belief that the 
The court held that 
negate the required 
In Hill, defendant's 
|e store's register book 
simplifying his future 
defendant's guilt. The 
whole, was insufficient 
defendant knew or had 
In possession of stolen 
In the case at hand, defendant failed to give any 
explanation as to how she came into physical possession and 
control of these items which were identified as recently stolen 
property belonging to Mr. Daily. Defendant's explanation is 
totally inadequate and fails to cast a reasonable doubt on 
defendant's guilt. Defendant would like the court to believe that 
in the 55 minutes from the time Mr. Daily left his home at 8:00 
p.m. until Officer Walker questioned the defendant at 8:55 p.m.; 
somehow Michael Smith, defendant's companion, went to Daily's 
home; stole the property and loaded it into the backseat of the 
defendant's car and put the watch inside defendant's windbreaker 
while the defendant was asleep in the same car. Even if the Court 
were to believe this story, the question remains why there were 
two distinct sets of footprints on Mr. Daily's vacuumed living 
room carpet. If the defendant was asleep, who was the other 
person who accompanied Michael Smith into the living room? (R 
32-33) 
In a 1980 case, the Utah Supreme Court upheld a 
conviction of theft by receiving and stated that "the evidence 
relied upon by the jury need not refute contrary allegations made 
by the defendant, as long as the jury verdict is supported by 
substantial evidence...the jury simply did not deem the 
defendant's explanation of his actions as being 'reasonable' and 
the attendant facts and circumstances adequately support the 
conclusion." State v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 229 (Utah 1980). 
Since it is the exclusive responsli bi 1 i ty of the jury to 
determine the weight of the evidence, a jury verdict will be 
upheld unless the court finds that the evidence is so lacking that 
no reasonable person can conclude that it eliminates all 
reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt. In determining the 
validity of the jury's verdict, some evidence, including 
reasonable inferences drawn from such evidence will suffice to 
support the jury's findings on each elemelnt of the crime. State 
v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 343 (Utah 1985). 
III. IT IS NOT NECESSARY TO INSTRUCT A JURY AS 
TO THE REASONABLE ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESIS THEORY 
IN A CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE CA^ET 
In a recent decision, the Utah Supreme Court held that a 
jury instruction as to the "reasonable alternative hypothesis" was 
unnecessary where the jury was instructed that the State must 
prove a defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. 
Ellis and Withers, No. 20631 (filed Dec.) 29, 1987) Utah Court of 
Appeals; State v. Shaffer, 725 P.2d 1301, 1312 (Utah 1986); State 
v. Hansen, 710 P.2d 182, 183 (Utah 1985). In the instant case, 
the trial court clearly and adequately informed the jury of the 
elements of the offense, and the State's burden of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt as to each element of the offense. 
Defendant asserts that "the standard of review in cases 
involving only circumstantial evidence (is more severe" inferring 
that somehow circumstantial evidence ought to be viewed as less 
convincing or to carry less weight than direct evidence. This is 
simply not true, it is a misstatement of the law. In Utah, as 
elsewhere, circumstantial evidence alone may be competent to 
establish the guilt of the accused. 30 Am. Jur.2d Evidence 
551125, 1126 (1967). 
Defendant's contention that the trial court erred in not 
instructing the jury as to the reasonable alternative hypothesis 
is without merit. "The use of the reasonable alternative 
hypothesis instruction is merely one way of expressing Ithe] 
necessary burden of proof and there is no apparent reason to 
mandate that one, and only one, particular instruction be used by 
trial judges in conveying to the jury the meaning of that elusive 
phrase, 'proof beyond a reasonable doubt.,M State v. Eagle, 611 
P.2d 1211 (Utah 1980). As long as the jury understands that the 
standard of proof in a criminal prosecution is proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt and that the burden of such proof lies witn the 
State the requirement is met and it is unnecessary to give the 
additional and redundant instruction of the reasonable alternative 
hypothesis. State v. Ellis and Withers, No. 20631 (filed Dec. 29, 
1987) Utah Court of Appeals; State v. Shaffer, 725 P.2d 1301 at 
1312; State v. McClain, 706 P.2d 603 (Utah 1985); State v. 
Clayton, 646 P.2d 723 (Utah 1982). 
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